Review requests by contracting authorities: when is it worth going to the KDB?

47 of 73 on the merits, 47/47 wins

In Hungary, the contracting authority can itself be the complainant before the KDB. Out of the full 2022 to mid-2026 KDB corpus, we identified 73 cases in which the complainant and the contracting authority are the same public institution. Of those, 47 reached a decision on the merits, and the complainant won 47 of 47. Zero losses on the merits.

The twenty-five procedural dismissals turned on procedural discipline, not on the substance of the complaint. Late filing, withdrawal, deficiencies left unremedied. The KDB dismissed no case on the ground that the complaint was legally unfounded.

Behind the numbers sits a rarely discussed Hungarian procurement-law mechanism. The list in Section 148(2) of the Hungarian Public Procurement Act (Act CXLIII of 2015, hereafter "Kbt.") opens with the contracting authority. The legislator therefore expressly contemplates that the contracting authority may itself be the complainant. The practical lesson is clear. If a contracting authority spots a material infringement in its own procedure, the route to the KDB is actually open, but the procedural wall is not trivial. The following sections show when and how it is worth using.

Who can be a complainant before the KDB?

The Kbt. lists the parties entitled to file a request for review in Section 148(2). The relevant first sentence of that provision, in the Hungarian original, reads:

„Kérelmet nyújthat be az ajánlatkérő, az ajánlattevő, közös ajánlattétel esetén bármelyik ajánlattevő, a részvételre jelentkező, közös részvételi jelentkezés esetén bármelyik részvételre jelentkező vagy az egyéb érdekelt, akinek jogát vagy jogos érdekét az e törvénybe ütköző tevékenység vagy mulasztás sérti vagy veszélyezteti."

In English, approximately: a complaint may be filed by the contracting authority, by the tenderer, in the case of a joint tender by any one of the tenderers, by the candidate seeking participation, in the case of a joint request to participate by any one of the candidates, or by any other interested party whose right or legitimate interest is infringed or jeopardised by an activity or omission contrary to this Act.

Two features of the provision matter here. First, the list opens with the contracting authority. The legislator therefore expressly contemplates that the contracting authority can be a complainant before the KDB. Second, the complaint must identify the harm to the contracting authority's own rights or legitimate interests. The status is not automatic: the complainant has to allege specific harm to its rights.

Procedural fee: different rules for the two variants

In the classic variant, where the contracting authority turns against its own winning tenderer, the administrative service fee under Section 150(4) of the Kbt. applies in the same way as for an external complainant. The fee is 0.5 per cent of the estimated value, at least HUF 300,000, capped at HUF 17,500,000 for procedures above the EU threshold and at HUF 5,000,000 for procedures below it.

In the self-reporting variant, from 1 February 2024 the contracting authority is exempt from the fee if it initiates the proceedings based on the unlawful nature of its own activity or omission (Section 150(2) of the Kbt.).

Legal patterns

The 73 cases are not homogeneous. The data split into two clearly distinct variants. The first: the contracting authority turns against its own winning tenderer. The second: the contracting authority asks for a finding of its own procurement infringement.

Classic variant: contracting authority against its own winner

In the classic variant, the contracting authority files a complaint against its own winning tenderer. The respondent is typically the winner of the procedure or the economic operator chosen for contract award. The legal basis is a contract-award or performance irregularity uncovered after the fact. The contracting authority asks the KDB to establish the irregularity to protect its position before termination or notice of termination.

In case D.554/2021, the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék (regional court covering areas around Budapest) filed a complaint against Vector Management Kft. In case D.135/2022, the Kaposi Mór Oktató Kórház (a teaching hospital in Kaposvár) filed against GASZTRÓ-TERNI Kft., citing a breach of Section 131(9) of the Kbt. In case D.403/2024, the Public Procurement Authority itself filed against Bechtle direct Kft. At the end of the case, the KDB imposed a fine of HUF 200,000 on the respondent.

In every classic-variant case reviewed, the KDB found an infringement. Of the 73 cases, 16, that is 22 per cent, resulted in a fine. The median fine is HUF 1 million, the maximum HUF 15 million. In each case the fine fell on the respondent winning tenderer. Along with cleaning up its own procedure after the fact, the contracting-authority complainant can also secure a financial sanction against the winner.

The classic variant is in play for you when the winning tenderer's conduct turns out to be unlawful after the fact, and a formal KDB finding is needed to support termination, notice of termination, or a damages claim.

Self-reporting variant: finding of one's own infringement

The second variant sits close to a tautology. The contracting authority flags the irregularity of its own procurement procedure to the KDB, and in many cases there is no real respondent outside its own organisation. The complaining institution, that is the contracting authority itself, does not substantively defend against the finding it has itself asked for.

In case D.56/2025, the Debreceni Egyetem (University of Debrecen) flagged a shortcoming in its own procedure. In case D.806/2024, the Siófoki Városüzemeltetési Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft. (municipal utility company of Siófok) turned to the KDB expressly citing Section 148(2) of the Kbt. In case D.2/2025, the Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (Hungarian Academy of Sciences) had its own procedural documents annulled.

The legal value of the self-reporting variant is not avoiding a loss. After an unfavourable internal audit, a Hungarian State Audit Office (Állami Számvevőszék) report, or a managing-authority observation, the contracting authority creates a formal legal basis for termination, for a fresh procurement procedure, or for fending off a grant clawback. The KDB's finding is directly usable in the funding relationship and in the next tender phase.

The self-reporting variant is in play for you when, following an internal audit, a State Audit Office observation, or a managing-authority observation, the lawfulness of the procedure has to be formally closed out before a direct consequence lands in the funding relationship.

Why does the complainant always win?

The one-sided outcome of the 47 decisions on the merits is not a coincidence. Three explanations together cover the pattern well.

The first is knowledge of the facts. The contracting authority holds the full documentation of its own procedure up front. Before filing, it knows what the invitation says, what the summary report contains, how the evaluation ran, and what evidence sits behind the alleged irregularity. At the moment of filing, the fact pattern is essentially undisputed.

The second is selection. In the classic variant, next to the minimum HUF 300,000 procedural fee and the costs of legal representation, the contracting authority does not initiate complainant proceedings in a doubtful case. In the self-reporting variant, from 1 February 2024 the fee no longer burdens the contracting authority, but preparing the complaint, the content of the internal-audit or State Audit Office signal, and the reputational cost of a published decision select in the same way. In both variants, taking on complainant status is a voluntary filter in favour of winnable cases.

The third is the role of the respondent. In the classic variant the respondent is the winning tenderer, whose defence before the KDB typically targets mitigation of the fine, not avoiding a finding of infringement. In the self-reporting variant there is no real respondent outside the complainant's own organisation.

Together, the three explanations account for the 100 per cent win rate on the merits. The same pattern shows up in our separate analysis of the win rate of the President of the Public Procurement Authority. Whichever side itself surfaces the infringement almost never loses on the merits.

Taken together, the three explanations mean that the contracting-authority complainant channel is not a theoretical option. It is a tool that works in practice. The effectiveness is not automatic, though. The next sections show where contracting-authority complaints most often fall short, and what that means in your specific situation.

Where a third of complaints fall short

Of the 73 cases, 25 did not reach a decision on the merits. The breakdown of rejections:

• 16 cases dismissed by the KDB on procedural grounds, typically late filing or failure to remedy deficiencies.
• 9 cases closed by the KDB because the complainant withdrew.
• 0 cases rejected on the merits, that is, on the ground that the complaint was legally unfounded.

The twenty-five rejections turn not on the strength of the complaint, but on the discipline of preparation. This is where most contracting-authority complaints fail. Most procedural dismissals stem from missing the preclusive deadline under Section 148(3) of the Kbt. (15 days in general, 10 days for a decision closing the procedure that itself is in breach), or the 30-day preclusive deadline tied to void contracts under Section 148(9) in conjunction with Section 137(1) of the Kbt. The weight of complainant error does not change the fact that once the contracting-authority complainant reaches the merits stage, the decision on the merits goes its way.

Who uses this route?

The 73 cases were brought by 55 different public institutions. The institutions bringing the most cases:

A single court dominates

One court, the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék, sits at the top of the combined list with nine cases. No other public institution comes close. The second group (Siófoki Városüzemeltetési Nonprofit Kft., Debreceni Egyetem, Kaposi Mór Oktató Kórház) brings 3 cases each, a third of the leader's count. The distribution has a long tail: 47 institutions appear in a single case each.

Breakdown by sector

The 73 cases break down by type of institution into 21 local governments (önkormányzatok), 15 state-owned business entities, 10 courts, 10 ministries, authorities or offices, 7 universities, 3 hospitals, and 7 other institution types. No single sector dominates. The share of courts stands out, but ninety per cent of that share falls on a single institution, the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék.

The alternative route under Section 152 of the Kbt.

The 73 contracting-authority complaint cases are not the whole picture. The contracting authority can reach the same legal outcome by a second route. Section 152(1) of the Kbt. lists exhaustively the bodies, including the President of the Public Procurement Authority, that may initiate ex officio remedy proceedings before the KDB. In practice the contracting authority can informally notify the President of its own procedure's irregularity. The President weighs it and brings the ex officio initiation in his or her own name.

The second channel can be more attractive on two counts. There are no complainant-side costs. There is no requirement to establish a legitimate interest. The downside is that the contracting authority loses formal control over the course of the proceedings, and the President of the Public Procurement Authority becomes the ultimate holder of the initiation.

Over the 2022-2026 corpus, the two proceeding types initiated by the President of the Public Procurement Authority (ex officio initiations based on contract review and on other grounds) together closed 447 out of 468 cases with a finding of infringement on the merits. The contracting-authority complainant channel is 47 out of 47. Both channels work, and the remedy direction against economic operators is similarly strict on both. The contracting authority's choice between the two is partly a procedural-convenience question and partly a strategic one.

Three doubts about the 47:0 ratio

The 47:0 ratio is not automatic. Three factors narrow the significance of the ratio picture, and anyone who would rely on it has to keep all three in view.

Limits of identifying the contracting authority and the complainant

Preliminary filtering of public-institution complainant cases flagged 102 cases. After case-by-case reconciliation, 73 cases had an exact institutional match between complainant and contracting authority, and 18 cases had two different public institutions on the two sides. In the remaining 11 cases the institution names in the raw decision extraction could not be reconciled rigorously. The figure of 73 is therefore a strict reading. It deliberately leaves out 11 cases. On the broader reading, the number rises to 84 and the pattern essentially does not change.

The tautology of the self-reporting variant

In the self-reporting variant there is no real adversarial relationship between complainant and respondent. By the nature of the proceeding, the decision goes the complainant's way. The self-reporting variant does not, however, make up the majority of cases examined. In the classic variant, where the respondent is a third-party private company, substantive complainant losses are likewise zero.

Sample size per institution

Of the 55 complainant institutions, 51 have only one or two cases in the sample. Win rates per individual institution are therefore not statistically meaningful. The 47:0 ratio is a feature of the whole sample, not of any one institution's practice. The Budapest Környéki Törvényszék's nine cases are enough on their own to signal an institutional pattern there, but the sample is not representative of courts as a whole.

When should you file?

Looking at the 73 cases, four typical triggers emerge behind a contracting-authority remedy initiation.

• Problems with the winner's contract award or performance. The winning tenderer refuses to sign the contract, fails to perform without the circumstances required by Section 131(9) of the Kbt., or during performance commits an infringement whose KDB finding is a precondition for termination, for notice of termination, or for a damages claim.
• Internal audit flags a procedural irregularity of your own. After an observation touching the lawfulness of the procurement, the contracting authority asks for a formal KDB finding against itself to lay the ground for termination, a fresh procedure, or warding off a grant clawback.
• A State Audit Office or managing-authority observation. After an official signal, the lawfulness of the procedure has to be formally closed out before a direct consequence lands in the funding relationship.
• EU funding and the risk of a grant clawback. A decision expressly finding lawful conduct forms the basis for documenting the beneficiary's defence in the monitoring and audit stages.

Two legal routes: which one to choose?

In the above situations you have two legal routes available.

The first is complainant status under Section 148(2) of the Kbt. You initiate the proceeding, you drive the complaint, and you control the course of the proceeding. The complainant-side cost in the classic variant is the administrative service fee under Section 150(4) of the Kbt. In the self-reporting variant, from 1 February 2024 you are exempt from the fee.

The second is the route under Section 152 of the Kbt. You informally notify the President of the Public Procurement Authority, who weighs it and then brings the initiation in his or her own name. Upside: no procedural fee, and you do not have to show harm to your own rights. Downside: the President of the Public Procurement Authority keeps the initiation in hand, you do not drive the proceedings, and the moment of filing is also decided by someone else.

The choice is partly a procedural-convenience question and partly a strategic one. The 47:0 ratio belongs to contracting authorities that acted as complainants themselves. The win rate behind the Section 152 route sits around the 98.46 per cent ratio of the President of the Public Procurement Authority. On the possibility of losing, the two show no material difference.

Preparation: where most complaints fall short

The 25 procedural dismissals cluster around three points. All three can be headed off in advance.

• Deadlines. The 15-day preclusive deadline (10 days for a decision closing the procedure) under Section 148(3) of the Kbt. runs from when the infringement becomes known. The 30-day preclusive deadline tied to void contracts under Section 148(9) is likewise preclusive. The very first step is documenting the date of knowledge and back-measuring the filing time of the complaint.
• Substantive completeness of the complaint. In a significant share of the rejected cases, the deficiencies left unremedied concern exactly these points: identifying the specific harm to the complainant's rights, citing the relevant Kbt. section precisely, setting out the facts in detail and identifying the evidence.
• Withdrawal of the complaint. The common factor behind the 9 withdrawal cases is a risk perceived after the initiation or a settlement reached with the winner. If the aim from the outset is to force a settlement, it is worth holding an informal preliminary conversation before filing the complaint.

Expert support

Preparing a request for review by a contracting authority runs along four parallel tracks: precise documentation of the facts, choice of the Kbt. legal basis, specific identification of the harm to rights, and defensible deadline calculation. The Sugallat public procurement advisory service for contracting authorities accompanies the contracting authority through these steps, from the initiation to securing the KDB decision.

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Methodological note

The analysis builds on a case-by-case reanalysis of the 2,511 KDB proceedings between 2022 and mid-2026. The raw decisions come from the Public Procurement Authority's portal. The contracting-authority complainant cases were filtered on two joint criteria: identifying the complainant as a public institution, and an exact match between the normalised complainant name and the normalised contracting-authority name. By normalised match we mean trimming the raw string, collapsing multiple spaces, and lowercase comparison.

The most important limit of the method for reading the figure of 73 is as follows. The combined "complainant/contracting authority" field in the decision header was filled by the data extraction with the contracting-authority institution name. In some of the combined-field cases the decision text named more than one complainant, but only the first was recorded. The 47:0 ratio on the merits for 2022-2026 applies to the contracting-authority complainant subsample as a whole. The distribution of case counts per institution is long-tailed. For that reason the analysis is not suitable for separately evaluating the practice of individual institutions.